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Background: Patient safety is one of the greatest challenges in healthcare. In the operating room errors are
frequent and often consequential. This article describes an approach to a successful implementation of a patient
safety program in the operating room, focussing on latent risk factors that influence patient safety. We performed
an intervention to improve these latent risk factors (LRFs) and increase awareness of patient safety issues amongst
OR staff.
Methods: Latent risk factors were studied using a validated questionnaire applied to the OR staff before and after
an intervention. A pre-test/post-test control group design with repeated measures was used to evaluate the effects
of the interventions. The staff from one operating room of an university hospital acted as the intervention group.
Controls consisted of the staff of the operating room in another university hospital. The outcomes were the
changes in LRF scores, perceived incident rate, and changes in incident reports between pre- and post-intervention.
Results: Based on pre-test scores and participants’ key concerns about organizational factors affecting patient safety
in their department the intervention focused on the following LRFs: Material Resources, Training and Staffing
Recourses. After the intervention, the intervention operating room - compared to the control operating room -
reported significantly fewer problems on Material Resources and Staffing Resources and a significantly lower score
on perceived incident rate. The contribution of technical factors to incident causation decreased significantly in the
intervention group after the intervention.
Conclusion: The change of state of latent risk factors can be measured using a patient safety questionnaire aimed
at these factors. The change of the relevant risk factors (Material and Staffing resources) concurred with a decrease
in perceived and reported incident rates in the relevant categories. We conclude that interventions aimed at
unfavourable latent risk factors detected by a questionnaire focussed at these factors may contribute to the
improvement of patient safety in the OR.Background
Patient safety is one of the greatest imperatives in
healthcare today [1]. However, there are many obstacles
that must be overcome to make the healthcare system
truly safe. This article describes one approach to suc-
cessful implementation of a patient safety program at
the systemic level. A specific strategy for operationaliz-
ing a safety program is provided. Through this strategy
it is possible to identify and address safety concerns pro-
actively, to develop specific tools and resources that can
be used to support an environment of safety and create* Correspondence: M.van_Beuzekom@lumc.nl
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distribution, and reproduction in any mediummechanisms to modify the program in response to pa-
tient and staff needs as well as changing priorities. In the
contrast between events that are often minor, but salient,
and the major, but latent or hidden, systemic weak-
nesses, most attention has been devoted to the obvious
problems. Success here, with individual protocols and
techniques, tackles the patient safety problem one issue
at a time. This article attempts to attack the deeper-
seated underlying problems that, when accurately identi-
fied, allow for remedial actions that can impact whole
classes of issues simultaneously.
It is increasingly accepted that adverse outcomes are
often due to system failures, whereby deficiencies at
many different levels create the context in which human
error can have a negative impact [2-4]. Studies also haveCentral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly cited.
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and to safety can be grouped into a limited number of
general failure classes or Latent Risk Factors (LRFs), in-
cluding such error-producing conditions such as poor
design, maintenance failures, unworkable procedures,
shortfalls in training, less than adequate tools and equip-
ment and inadequate staffing [5]. For example, nurse
understaffing has been ranked by both the public and
physicians as one of the greatest threats to patient safety
in US hospitals [6]. The identification of LRFs, that may
impact the expected course of care and often comprom-
ise patient safety, can support a better understanding of
the operating room as a system and the identification of
system components that influence patient safety [7]. A
proactive systems approach to surgical safety suggests
that it is necessary to study all aspects of the system that
comprises a surgical operation, ranging from such issues
as equipment design and use, to communication and
team coordination [8,9]. Safety experts argue that pro-
actively reducing such latent risk factors, that increase
the risk of error by many individuals, will result in deli-
vering safer care more quickly than taking measures
directed, often reactively, at specific individuals [2]. Con-
sistent with the objective of minimal patient harm, safety
management in health care should be proactive rather
than reactive; that is, broad risks should be anticipated
and reduced before patients are harmed rather than
waiting to identify specific problems and then attacking
them. The question is, how can you identify such risks
before an incident, rather than waiting for an adverse
event or hoping for a report that can uncover a
problem?
A proactive error management system, designed to
measure and reduce the adverse impact of LRFs within
an organization, may provide the answer. Proactive sys-
tems work in part by asking people to judge how fre-
quently each of a number of factors such as staffing,
supervision, procedures and communication impacts
adversely on specific aspects of their work. This type of
proactive approach allows the identification of LRFs be-
fore they give rise to errors that can compromise pa-
tient safety. Such a system may serve not only to
reduce error, but also to foster a culture that, by mov-
ing away from blaming the individual, encourages
reporting, creating a virtuous circle [10]. In the operat-
ing room (OR) errors are frequent and often conse-
quential. In reported studies on the incidence of
adverse events in hospitals, the largest number occurs
in the OR. The proportion of adverse events in the op-
erating room appears to be remarkably stable, compris-
ing approximately 50 % of all adverse events within a
hospital [1,11-13]. This suggests that the OR is a do-
main in which improved safety is an urgent and signifi-
cant challenge. A critical first step in an improvementprocess involves systematically addressing those factors
contributing to adverse events in the OR. Increased
awareness of patient safety issues and the resources that
are available to both health care practitioners and con-
sumers can help staff ward off patient safety problems
before they occur [14].
Aim of the study
This study is prospective and is concerned with the
question whether an intervention, based on a safety pro-
gram, leads to improvement on latent risk factors and
an increase in incident reporting. It was anticipated that
concretely addressing LRFs, rather than just a general
awareness campaign, will contribute to the prevention
of future errors and consequently to improved patient
outcomes. This article describes the results of the inter-




A pre-test/post-test control group design was used to
evaluate the effects of the interventions. The staff from
one university hospital operating room acted as the
intervention group (I-OR). The control group which
received no interventions consisted of the staff of the
OR in another university hospital (C-OR). The organiza-
tions were located in the Netherlands. At baseline and
again at follow-up after 1.5 year all staff (including trai-
nees) and operating room nurses/technicians who had
been in their job three months or more were approached
and invited to fill out the survey. The study was
approved by the Research Ethics Board of the Leiden
University Medical Centre (the Netherlands).
LOTS-study
The hypothesis that correcting LRFs, concentrating on
systemic rather than individual issues, will result in safer
care became the cornerstone of the Leiden Operating
Theatre Safety (LOTS) project. This project aims to
identify system failures in the OR irrespective of the
errors and incidents directly, and to develop and evalu-
ate interventions to reduce those failures, leading to a
reduction in errors in the long term.
To assess the OR’s resistance to error a comprehensive
survey instrument was developed measuring the pres-
ence of systemic failures that lie dormant in the working
environment of the operating room and intensive care
unit - the Leiden Operating Theatre and Intensive Care
Safety (LOTICS) scale. It can be used in a pre-test, inter-
vention, post-test design to evaluate the effectiveness of
changes brought about in the hospital or a specific unit
[15].
van Beuzekom et al. BMC Surgery 2012, 12:10 Page 3 of 11
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2482/12/10Survey instrument
Latent risk factors
The approach taken to assess the state of the individual
LRFs is analogous to a health check, assessing a limited
number of well-chosen diagnostic vital signs. Items, pre-
sented as statements, can be indicators of either poten-
tial problems or good practice. Possessing the former or
lacking the latter can both be treated as indications that
there are latent failures present in a particular LRF. Fail-
ure to find indications of problems and possession of the
factors that are evidence of good practice can both be
treated as indications that there are no latent failures
present in a particular LRF.
Latent risk factors were measured with the LOTICS-
scale (Additional file 1: appendix 1) [15]. The LOTICS has
been validated with respect to factor structure and reliabil-
ity of the scales, as well as its content and discriminative
validity, and measures 11 LRFs with a total of 51 indicator
questions: Training (6 items, α= .77; e.g. “In my depart-
ment, staff are well trained in the use of new equipment”),
Staffing Resources (6 items, α= .81; e.g. “In my depart-
ment, there are enough experienced staff”), Planning &
Coordination (3 items α= .75; e.g. “In my department, only
short-term plans are made”), Communication (6 items,
α= .84; e.g. “Information to perform procedure is available
at the time when it is needed“), Material Resources (5
items, α= .75; e.g. “In my department, material/equipment
is of insufficient quality”), Maintenance (4 items, α= .81;
e.g. “Maintenance inspections are carried out on time”),
Design (4 items, α= .78; e.g. “Controls or displays are hard
to read”), Quality of Procedures (6 items, α= .79; e.g. “In
my department, procedures, rules, and guidelines are often
not feasible in practice”), Teamwork (4 items, α= .74; e.g.
“Members of my team work well together during the oper-
ation ”), Team Instruction (3 items, α= .80; e.g. “Team
members receive sufficient instructions during the oper-
ation”), and Situational Awareness (4 items, α= .77; e.g.
“There is sufficient information exchange during the sur-
gery”). Respondents indicate their agreement on a 4-point
rating scale (1= strongly disagree, 4 = strongly agree). The
same scalar structure was presented throughout the ques-
tionnaire, and then adjusted post-hoc. For all LFRs, nega-
tively formulated items were recoded so that a higher
score always indicates more favorable perceptions about
organizational and environmental conditions of work.
Perceived incident rate
In this study, incidents are defined as all safety-related
events including accidents (with negative outcomes such
as damage and injury), near misses (where an accident
could have happened had there been no timely and ef-
fective recovery) and errors (no harm events). We asked
respondents to report how often errors, near-misses and
accidents occurred in their departments. The three itemswere scored on a six-point scale ranging from 1 (never)
to 6 (very frequently), with a higher score indicating a
greater perception of incidents.
The questionnaire has an additional demographic sec-
tion where respondents fill in their department or ward,
job tenure on current ward (1 =<1 year, 2 = 1-5 years,
3 = 6–10 years, and 4=> 10 years), age and gender.
Finally, participants were asked about the organizational
and environmental conditions that affect patient safety in
their department and the possible remediable action alter-
natives for addressing them.
Incident reporting
Incident data were collected and then systematically
analysed using the Prevention and Recovery Information
System for Monitoring and Analysis (PRISMA) - Med-
ical method over a 12-month period before and after the
intervention [16]. The PRISMA method is based on the
so-called system approach to the problem of human
error and therefore concentrates on the conditions
under which individuals work. It was originally devel-
oped in and for the steel industry and has been applied
successfully in the medical domain [16,17]. Key compo-
nents are an in-depth incident analysis to detect causal
factors, and the Eindhoven Classification Model to clas-
sify the root causes found into technical, organizational,
human, and patient related factors.
Intervention
A multidisciplinary safety committee (surgeons, anesthe-
tists, operating room and recovery nurses) was created to
improve incident reporting and to develop a number of
measures aimed at the LRFs which need improvement.
The level of reporting of incidents was considered to
be an important factor of the safety program. To im-
prove the quality and completeness of reporting inci-
dents and to achieve a general raising of awareness of
patient safety problems we developed and implemented
a voluntary electronic/web based reporting system and
provided feedback to demonstrate the value of reporting
by showing its effects on organizational culture and pa-
tient safety. Feedback was always provided at team level.
In case of serious incidents there was also feedback at
the individual level. All reports were reviewed by safety
committee members, and selected reports were dis-
cussed during the monthly meetings. When required,
reports were further analyzed by individual committee
members according to their expertise.
The results of the pre-test formed the basis for the
choice of interventions. Based on these results (see
Table 1) the following LRFs were considered best targets
for intervention: Communication, Material Resources,
Training, Planning, and Staffing Resources. Compared to
the other LRFs respondents in I-OR scored less favorably
Table 1 Mean LOTICS scores and perceived incident rate at pre-test compared for the I-OR and the C-OR (t-tests)
LRFs of LOTIC-scale I- OR N=111 C-OR N =82 Mean SD t df P 95 % CI
Communication I-OR 2.43 .43 -3.00 186 .003 -.055 .12
C-OR 2.61 .39
Design I-OR 2.95 .32 .07 182 .942 -.017 .14
C-OR 2.94 .38
Maintenance I-OR 2.78 .53 -1.88 174 .061 -.16 .06
C-OR 2.92 .40
Material Resources I-OR 2.59 .35 .33 185 .745 .09 .25
C-OR 2.57 .39
Planning & Coordination I-OR 2.71 .37 -2.25 183 .026 -.04 .13
C-OR 2.83 .37
Teamwork I-OR 2.91 .32 -.33 186 .740 .07 .19
C-OR 2.93 .29
Procedures I-OR 2.72 .33 -.82 184 .415 -.04 .09
C-OR 2.74 .33
Situation Awareness I-OR 2.85 .41 .96 182 .338 .12 .31
C-OR 2.79 .44
Team instructions I-OR 2.84 .40 -.10 178 .924 .12 .26
C-OR 2.84 .33
Training I-OR 2.67 .45 -2.36 187 .019 -.05 .12
C-OR 2.82 .38
Staffing Resources I-OR 2.71 .46 -187 100 .793 -.02 .16
C-OR 2.81 ,30
Perceived incident rate I-OR 3.97 .58 -.12 178 .901 -.02 .16
C-OR 3.98 .56
Significant values are shown in bold.
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tion, Planning and Training, the I-OR scored even lower
than the C-OR (see Table 1).
At baseline we asked participants about their concerns
on patient safety in their department. A number of issues
related to the LRFs studied were named. On average, three
times more issues were identified for LRFs with unfavour-
able scores than for LRFs with favourable scores. In I-OR
most problems concerned Training, Material Resources,
and Staffing Resources. Given these findings and to create
as much possible involvement for the intervention we
decided to focus on these three LRFs. However we rea-
lized that an intervention can have effects on other LRFs
beyond the three selected, because changes do not occur
in isolation. Moreover, in the literature, Material
Resources, Training and Staffing Resources are mentioned
as important contributors to medical errors [18,19].
Material resources (1) Surgical adverse events are often
attributable to technique-related procedures that occur
during the operation, many of which are considered pre-
ventable [20] [21]. Variations in equipment in its use in-
crease the likelihood of error [22]. People may be more
willing to violate safety rules because the material doesnot function in the way it is supposed to do, either be-
cause of poor maintenance or because of faulty design.
Training (2) Lack of training and experience are also
mentioned as sources of medical errors, although these
causes are usually not directly documented in studies of
errors and incidents. Training has, however, been shown
to decrease incident rates and increase the ability to
solve problems, particularly for inexperienced profes-
sionals [23-25].
Staffing resources (3). There is little published work
examining the relationship between workload and either
quality or safety of anaesthetic care [26]. Staff often
forms the last layer of defence for error occurrence and
understaffing or insufficient staffing is a threat to patient
safety in the OR [27]. Adequate staffing is fundamental
to quality care; evidence is mounting that increasing the
number of registered nurses results in better patient
safety [28]. Higher staffing levels are associated with
lower mortality outcomes in UK hospitals [29].
We started the intervention with a training session to
show which errors are made in the operating room and
how they can be traced back to latent risk factors. In
addition, sessions were held to introduce the new
Table 2 Safety program
Awareness To create awareness about safety, a symposium about safety was organized.
Topics were: the system approach to human error safety problems in the OR and incident reporting
Error reporting A local committee of the department’s anaesthesiology and surgery was set.
Introduction of an electronic incident reporting management system accessible to all staff and easy to use.
Providing feedback to demonstrate that reporting leads to changes.
Errors were discussed in the team meetings.
Every month a newsletter was distributed with information on reported errors.
and measures taken promoting report of near misses and errors.
Material Resources Inventory of all equipment and supplies of anaesthesia and surgery.
Standardization of equipment and supplies in anaesthesia and surgery for all equipment development of manuals
with a uniform design.
Training Training of all OR staff in the use of equipment.
Staffing Resources Increasing participation in decision making.
Introduction of frequently held staff meeting, at least once a month.
Increasing job autonomy shifting for a specific task responsibility and control from supervisor to staff.
Responsibility for safety in the working environment.
Intervision for registered nurses.
Personal coaches assigned to trainees.
Social activities to promote team building.
More trainees were trained.
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volving standardization of materials and equipment was
performed. All OR staff then received training for all the
equipment used during operations. Parallel to this, a pro-
gram aimed at improving nurse retention was carried out
focussing on work climate characteristics like participation
in decision making, job autonomy and social support. The
content of the safety program is described in Table 2.
Statistical analyses
The data were analysed using the statistical software
package SPSS version 16. Negatively worded items were
reverse scored so that their valence matched the posi-
tively worded items. T-tests were used to assess differ-
ences at pre-test between the intervention (I-OR) and
control group (C-OR). Chi square analyse was used for
gender and reported incidents. As a means of assessing
the effects of the interventions, analyses of covariance
(ANCOVA) were carried out. In the ANCOVAs, age,
gender, job tenure on current ward, and pre-test scores
on LRFs and perceived incident rate were used as
covariates.Table 3 Demographic characteristics of the participants in th
Pre-test I-OR N=110 C-OR N=82
Age 35.4 (10.9) 40.8 (9.4)
Employment status (hours) 31.4 ( 9.3) 31.1 (11.7)
Job tenure 2.7 (99) 3.2 (1.02)
Gender 11 % male 89 % female 36 % male 72
Post-test I-OR n= 108 C-OR n= 97
Age 36.2 (11.4) 40.3 (11.3)
Employment status (hours) 30.8 (10) 31.2 (9.93)
Job tenure 2.8 (94) 2.8 (.93)
Gender 10 % male 90 % female 23 % male 67Participation and dropout
Baseline response rate was 59 %; 193 (I-OR 111 and C-
OR 82) out of 327 questionnaires were returned. The
response rate at post-test was 62 %; 205 (I-OR 108 and
C-OR 97) out of 333 questionnaires were returned. Of
the 111 professionals in I-OR and the 82 professionals
in C-OR who filled out the questionnaire at baseline, 62
in I-OR and 40 in C-OR participated at follow-up as
well. At both points of measurement there were no sig-
nificant differences in demographic characteristics be-
tween respondents and non-respondents. For both I-OR
and C-OR applies that there were no significant differ-
ences between subjects participating only in the first or
the second measurement and those who took part in
both measurements on demographic characteristics,
LRF scores and perceived incident rate. There was just
one exception; at the pre-test in C-OR staff who partici-
pated in both measurements reported more favorable
on Team Instructions than staff who participated only
in the first measurement.
Comparing I-OR with C-OR at pre-test on demo-
graphic characteristics, LRFs, and perceived error ratee I-OR and C-OR at pre- and post-test
t 95 %CI lower upper P
-3.26 (1,187) -7.95 -1.958 .001
.205 (1,185) -2.70 3.32 .868
-.3.32 (1,185) -.87 -1.88 .001
% female χ2 16.75 <.01
t 95 %CI lower upper P
-2.602- (1,202) -7.30 -1.006 .010
-.278(1, 202) -3.16 2.38 .781
.146 (1,203) -.278 .240 .884
% female χ2 5.907 <.05
Table 4 Mean LOTICS scores and perceived incident rate
at pre-test compared for the I-OR and C-OR at post-test
(t-tests)
LRFs of LOTIC-scale I-OR C- OR t df P 95 % CI
n= 108 n= 97
Communication pre 2.43 2.61
post 2.38 2.57 -3.42 203 .001 -.306 -.082
Design pre 2.95 2.94
post 2.99 3.03 -.749 203 .455 -.028 .058
Maintenance pre 2.78 2.92
post 2.91 2.94 -.515 193 .607 -.143 .084
Material Resources pre 2.59 2.57
post 2.72 2.53 3.602 202 .000 .085 .290
Planning & Coordination pre 2.71 2.83
post 2.78 2.83 -.911 201 .363 -.143 .052
Teamwork pre 2.91 2.93
post 2.93 2.92 .160 201 .873 -.091 .107
Procedures pre 2.72 2.74
post 2.69 2.70 -.392 202 .696 -.103 .69
Situation Awareness pre 2.85 2.79
post 2.82 2.83 -.264 192 .792 -.143 .109
Team instructions pre 2.84 2.84
post 2.84 2.81 .565 190 . 573 -.087 .157
Training pre 2.67 2.82
post 2.81 2.82 -.228 203 .820 -.114 .091
Staffing Resources pre 2.71 2.81
post 2.84 2.73 1.989 203 .048 .001 .215
Perceived incident rate pre 3.97 3.98
post 3.59 3.96 -4.079 202 .000 -.551 -.192
Significant values are shown in bold.
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ment and age (Table 3). Staff in the intervention group
was younger, had shorter job tenure and are more often
female. For this reason, age, job tenure on current
ward, and gender were entered as covariates in all effect
analyses for the group who took part in both measure-
ments. At the pre-test I-OR differed from C-OR on
three of the dependent variables: Communication, Plan-
ning & Coordination, and Training (Table 1). Staff in I-
OR reported less favourable on each of these LRFs than
staff in C-OR.
Effects of intervention
First, changes over time in the I-OR were analyzed by
comparing the results of all staff who took part at base-
line with those of all staff who took part at follow-up.
The results of the t-tests, pre- and post-test mean scores
on LRFs and perceived incident rate for I-OR and C-OR
are shown in Table 4.
The I-OR rated more favorably on Staffing Resources
and Material Resources at follow-up than at baseline.
For the other LRFs no statistically significant changes
over time were found, except for communication. This
LRF scored in the I-OR less favorably at follow-up than
at baseline. Finally, the I-OR scored significantly lower
on perceived incident rate at follow-up than at baseline.
At follow-up the C-OR rated more favorably on Design
and less favorably on Staffing Resources than at baseline.
Second, separate univariate ANCOVAs were con-
ducted, using data from staff that participated in both
measurements, to test if there had been a different devel-
opment in the I-OR compared to the C-OR from pre- to
post-test. The intervention had focused on three LRFs:
Material Resources, Training and Staffing Resources. So,
we expected at follow-up higher scores on these LRFs in
I-OR, indicating fewer problems, than in C-OR. Consist-
ent with our expectations, there was a positive effect of
the intervention aimed at Staffing Resources. When pre-
test scores, age, gender, and job tenure were used as cov-
ariates, a significant effect over time was found between
the I-OR and the C-OR. (Table 5). Staffing resources
improved in the I-OR but worsened in the C-OR from
pre-test to post-test measurement (Figure 1). There was
also a positive effect of the intervention aimed at Mater-
ial Resources. When pre-test scores, age, gender, and job
tenure, were used as covariates, a significant difference
was found on Material Resources to the advantage of the
I-OR (Figure 2). The intervention aimed at Training was
not significant. When pre-test scores, age, gender, and
job tenure, were used as covariates, there was no signifi-
cant difference between the I-OR and the C-OR on
Training over time.
We also expected in I-OR a decrease in perceived inci-
dent rate. The results indeed support our hypothesisshowing a significant difference between the I-OR and
the C-OR in perceived incident rate over time when pre-
test scores, age, gender, and job tenure were used as cov-
ariates. There was a decrease in perceived incident rate
in the I-OR (Figure 3) while perceived incident rate did
not change in the C-OR.
The number of reported incidents multiplied with a
factor 2.4 between the pre/post intervention period. In
the year before the intervention there were 250 reported
errors. Of these errors 80.8 % were classified as human,
8.8 % as technical, 9.6 % as organizational, and 0.8 % as
patient related. In the year after the intervention the
number of reported errors increased to 629 of which
were 83.9 % human, 3.7 % technical, 10.8 %
organizational, and 0.95 % patient related. The increase
in reported incidents was mainly due to an increase in
the number of reported near misses and errors. The de-
crease in the contribution of technical causes, referring
to physical items such as equipment, materials, instru-
mentation, installations, labels and forms, from 8.8 % to
3.7 % was significant (p= .001).
Table 5 Comparison of I-OR and C-OR by separate
univariate ANCOVAs (repeated measures) with pre-test
scores, age, gender and job tenure as covariates
LRFs of LOTIC-scale I-OR n=62 C- OR n=40 F ratio P
Communication pre 2.48 2.54 3.07 .083
post 2.35 2.54
Design pre 2.94 2.96 0.26 .872
post 2.99 2.95
Maintenance pre 2.81 2.98 2.43 .122
post 2.94 2.94
Material Resources pre 2.60 2.51 8.38 .005
post 2.73 2.50
Planning & Coordination pre 2.75 2.78 2.14 .147
post 2.83 2.73
Teamwork pre 2.93 2.86 .167 .684
post 2.95 2.86
Procedures pre 2.68 2.72 0.41 .525
post 2.66 2.70
Situation Awareness pre 2.84 2.71 1.90 .171
post 2.78 2.77
Team Instruction pre 2.87 2.75 0.73 .788
post 2.84 2.74
Training pre 2.72 2.77 1.61 .207
post 2.80 2.74
Staffing Resources pre 2.70 2.72 10.3 .002
post 2.81 2.58
Perceived Incident rate pre 3.93 3.96 5.45 .02
post 3.53 3.88





















Figure 1 Significant differences between I-OR (1) and C-OR (2) on pre
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The study shows that our intervention aimed at Mater-
ial resources, Training and Staffing resources resulted in
demonstrable changes of scores on two of the relevant
LOTICS scales. This type of intervention can provide
direct benefits to the staff of an OR, because the
changes on the working environment were both visible
and resulted in improvement in task performance and
are therefore likely to be accepted.
The philosophy underlying the development of the
LOTICS scale is that interventions should address broad
categories of error types (the underlying pathology) ra-
ther than individual symptoms. Given this approach, the
intervention aimed at improving material resources was
based on the concept of standardization. Standardization
is a concept well understood by other safety critical in-
dustries that value the benefit of lightening the mental
burden on staff and users to allow them to concentrate
better on the job at hand [30]. In aviation the
standardization and disciplined use of procedures,
termed SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures) is widely
argued to be the most critical factor distinguishing be-
tween good and poor outcomes in aviation incidents
[31] and could be adapted to the OR to develop proto-
cols that minimize the influence of competing tasks and
high workload. Standardization of material and equip-
ment further results in the reduction of costs of oper-
ation, in maintenance, repair, storage, and simplified
issue procedures. As part of the process in I-OR to
standardize and streamline instrumentation and equip-
ment, including locations, old and/or less user-friendlyposttestpretest
Control OR





















Figure 2 Significant differences between I-OR (1) and C-OR (2) on pre and post-test scores: Material resources.
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and manuals with a uniform design were developed.
This improvement (at a general level) should and did
affect responses to specific test items referring to,
amongst others, the availability of equipment, their qual-
ity, timely repair and replacement. Moreover, after the
intervention PRISMA identified technical factors to be
significantly less important as causes of incidents.
Understaffing is one of the greatest threats to patient
safety. Staff are often the last layer of defence for any
error occurrence and particularly the proportion of pro-
























Figure 3 Significant differences between I-OR (1) and C-OR (2) on pre[25,32,33]. At the time of the pre-test there were
shortages in OR personnel in 14 out of the 60 (23 %)
Dutch hospitals investigated [33]. One of the reasons for
understaffing in the Netherlands is that working in
healthcare is found to be less appealing [34,35]. To limit
turnover and to attract new personnel we need to en-
hance the attractiveness of the profession. To investigate
how this can be achieved we designed and evaluated a
number of intervention programs. These programs fo-
cused on the enhancement of well-studies work climate
characteristics: participation in decision making, job au-
tonomy and social support. Employee perceptions ofpost-testpre-test
Control OR
and post-test on perceived incident rate.
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sors, and a number of individual and organizational out-
come variables [36]. In addition to the focus on work
climate characteristics more training opportunities were
created so that more trainees could be qualified. As
expected the interventions turned out to result in higher
scores in I-OR compared to C-OR on aspects like the
amount of staff to provide good care and the amount of
experienced staff.
Staff turnover rate in I-OR decreased from 9.4 % in
the year before the intervention to 5.1 % in the year after
the intervention. Although we realize that turnover is
determined by many factors, including labor market, it
is likely that some of this decline can be attributed to
the interventions.
Change can be a complex and drawn-out process that
depends on a variety of contextual factors. The OR is a
highly compartmentalized department structure which
brings together members from multiple disciplines
whose training and professional goals vary. Lack of com-
munication between operating room personnel is com-
mon [37]. Most surgical errors are not attributable to an
individual but involve multiple personnel and steps; ap-
proximately 43 % of errors are due to poor communica-
tion [20]. During the intervention in the OR we actually
saw an increase in reported problems with communica-
tion. When communication problems do occur, they are
found most often between different professional mem-
bers of a team, such as between anaesthesiologist and
surgeon or between nurses and doctors [38].The staff of
the I-OR indicated that they needed more information
to do their tasks. A tentative explanation for this result
could be that having created heightened awareness about
safety issues, the staff was more alert to the communica-
tion problems they experienced.
The importance of incident reporting is widely recog-
nized [10,39]. Unfortunately, reporting is grossly incom-
plete. After the intervention, incident reporting rates in
I-OR increased significantly compared with pre inter-
vention rates. We realize that it is difficult to deduce
from this result whether the 2.4x change in error report-
ing reflects a change in report behaviors with actual
rates remaining constant or whether the 2.4x change in
error reports reflects an increase in error rates despite
the intervention. Various studies, however, showed that
as an institution improves in the care it delivers and its
safety culture more problems may be reported since
open reporting is a tenet of safe practice [40]. Increased
incident reporting rates may not be indicative of an un-
safe organization, but may reflect a shift in organizational
culture [41]. In this context it is important to note that
the total number of reported incidents more than
doubled while the contribution of technical factors to in-
cident causation remained constant.The propensity to report is probably further strength-
ened in our study by the implementation of the elec-
tronic report system. Various studies showed that an
accessible and easy to use reporting system [42], the
understanding that the reports will be handled in a non-
punitive manner [43], and the notion that the reports
are taken seriously and will lead to enhanced learning
and systematic changes which will prevent it from recur-
ring [44], positively affects the willingness to report inci-
dents. The empirical findings in this and other studies,
taken as a whole, suggest that our result, an increase in
incident reporting in I-OR, reflects a change in report
behaviors rather than an increase in incident rates.
We believe that this work can contribute to patient
safety initiatives and research in two ways: (1) our ex-
perience provides detailed insight in the latent risk fac-
tors, (2) our findings suggest that the methodology used
in the study shows promise as a method for evaluating
changes in the quality and safety of care in the operating
rooms. Changing culture is a new watchword in patient
safety [45]. The willingness of staff to speak up about a
patient-safety concern is an important part of safety in
the operating room [46]. Therefore there needs to be a
culture of openness [47]. We think a first step is this ap-
proach is to build a strong foundation of safety aware-
ness among your staff and this may best be done by
implementing concrete and visible improvements. We
think staff perceptions of safety are a high priority issue
within the OR, which will eventually motivate staff to
take greater ownership of and responsibility for patient
safety.
Limitation
In the present study the intervention addressing train-
ing did not result in a significant improvement. This
may have been due to a failure to address the problem
at a deeper level, that is, the deficiencies in the busi-
ness process behind the detected indicators. It is con-
ceivable that the intervention attacked the problem at a
‘symptom curing’ level the training of the use of new
equipment. As a result, this intervention may not have
remedied problems at a systemic level, as revealed by
the responses to test items referring to various other
aspects of the training procedure.
Safety questionnaires are increasingly used in health-
care for assessment of safety issues, but they differ in the
scope and extent. Sexton and co-workers developed a
safety attitudes questionnaire that was validated over a
wide range of clinical areas (ICU, OR, inpatient settings
and ambulatory clinics) and 3 countries and adminis-
tered to a large study group [48]. The factors identified
by their questionnaire were teamwork climate, safety cli-
mate, perception of management, job satisfaction, work-
ing conditions and stress recognition. They claim that
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and to measure effectiveness of interventions. Similar
safety questionnaires have been used by others to access
teamwork and safety climate in hospitals and nursing
units [49,50].
Compared to their study our study was limited to a
smaller group of disciplines and settings. Furthermore
our questionnaire was more limited in scope and more
directed to a limited set of factors that we connected to
latent risk factors (LRFs), as identified in incident ana-
lysis. But a major difference is that those LRFs assessed
enabled a much more concrete identification of measures
for intervention, as compared with abstract factors like
the perception of management, job satisfaction and safety
climate, while still providing a way of assessing pre- and
post-intervention values. There is still much work
required before we are able to understand the full value
of using climate questionnaires in health care, as Prono-
vost and Sexton have [51] have recently pointed out.Conclusion
The change of state of LRFs can be measured using a
patient safety questionnaire aimed at these factors. The
change of the relevant risk factors (material and staffing
resources) concurred with a decrease in perceived and
reported error rates in the relevant categories. We con-
clude that interventions aimed at unfavourable latent
risk factors detected by a questionnaire focussed at these
factors may contribute to the improvement of patient
safety in the OR.Additional file
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